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Abstract
Background: Muslim majority countries have experienced a considerable burden of COVID-19 infection. However, there 
has been a relative lack of research comparing COVID-19 outbreaks and responses between Muslim-majority countries. 
Aims: This study aimed to analyse COVID-19 burden, epidemiology and mitigation strategies in Muslim-majority coun-
tries.
Methods: We use a mixed-methods approach to describe the course of the COVID-19 pandemic throughout the Islamic 
world, highlight the range of non-pharmaceutical interventions used and the speed with which they were implemented, 
and investigate reasons behind the differing responses between Muslim-majority countries. The number of cases and 
deaths per million population, and the mean time taken to implement a range of policies, were compared across the Is-
lamic world. Cases per million population and the mean estimated doubling time for cases was compared between Mus-
lim-majority countries on the basis of governance systems, rapidity of institution of mitigation strategies and conflict 
groups. We also evaluated pushback to implementation of measures within MMCs, especially from religious quarters.
Results: Non-democratic regimes had much shorter doubling time of cases compared to functional democratic Mus-
lim-majority countries (mean 33.9 versus 66.5 days, P = 0.002) and a significantly greater proportion of countries appeared 
to have flattened the curve by 1 June 2020 (43.8% versus 12.5%, P < 0.03). The doubling time was also significantly greater 
among countries who implemented lockdown and mitigation measures early (66.7 versus 16.7 days, P < 0.003).
Conclusion: Our analysis indicates wide diversity in the COVID-19 response across Muslim majority countries with 
clear indication that functional democracies were able to contain the epidemic significantly better than nondemocratic 
regimes. Future analysis should focus on determination of sub-national differentials and risks as well as targeting of 
interventions.
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Introduction
COVID-19, a novel respiratory disease first identified 
in late December 2019, was declared a global pandemic 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 11 March, 
2020. Since first emerging from Wuhan, China, COV-
ID-19 has resulted in almost 30 million recognised infec-
tions across 185 countries, and 941 000 deaths at the time 
of writing (1–3).
Given the absence of a vaccine or viable treatment 
for COVID-19, non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) 
have been the main instruments for mitigating risks of 
infection in tackling this ongoing epidemic (4). These 
interventions have ranged in complexity and severity 
from use of face masks, hand hygiene and physical 
distancing to curfews, international travel restrictions, 
military-led nationwide lockdowns and border closures. 
Previous outbreaks, such as that of Ebola in 2014 and 
H1N1 in 2009, have also shown that the timely use of 
NPIs and implementation of such measures can have 
an impact in reducing the spread of infectious diseases 
(5,6). However, many of these measures such as social 
distancing and school closures, as well as closure of 
places of worship, have only rarely been implemented 
and require a combination of community buy-in and 
governmental oversight. Given the reported success of 
many Asian countries in rapid control of COVID-19, such 
as in China, Republic of Korea, Viet Nam and Singapore, 
there is the notion that some government characteristics 
and socio-political systems may have been more effective 
in implementing NPIs and controlling the pandemic 
than others (7).
Muslim majority populations do not represent a 
homogenous block but do have geographic clustering 
mainly in the Eastern Mediterranean, North African and 
Southeast Asian regions. We have previously evaluated 
the state of reproductive, maternal and child health and 
implementation within health systems in many Muslim-
majority countries or regions and documented the 
important role of governance as well as societal factors 
such as female education and empowerment (8,9). The 
relative role of governments versus religious schools of 
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thought and political parties are also important drivers of 
population uptake of interventions, such as reproductive 
health and family planning, and have at times influenced 
vaccine acceptability, evidenced by the struggle to 
eradicate polio in some countries. There are also 
communal religious activities such as mass gatherings 
on Fridays and during the course of Ramadan and the 
annual Hajj – all potential barriers in implementation 
of NPIs in some contexts. Conversely, the Muslim use of 
facial coverings by females in public could be protective. 
Muslim-majority countries have experienced a 
considerable burden of COVID-19, with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Turkey among the first countries 
outside of China to see a large-scale outbreak, followed 
by Pakistan. However, there is relatively little research 
comparing COVID-19 outbreaks and responses between 
Muslim-majority countries, especially in the relationship 
between community engagement, participation in NPIs 
and the role of governments and governance mechanisms 
(10). In addition to understanding the progression of 
COVID-19 outbreaks in these countries, an understanding 
of how each had tackled their outbreak could offer 
potentially useful insights for future mitigation 
strategies, including vaccination programmes. 
In this article we describe the course of the COVID-19 
pandemic across Muslim-majority countries, highlight 
the range of NPIs used after the pandemic was called, and 
the speed with which they were implemented. We also 
investigate how variations in governance mechanisms 
and style influenced the response to COVID-19 and 
potential implications for future strategies.
Methods
Case and mortality data were extracted from the COV-
ID-19 Dashboard created by the Center for Systems 
Science and Engineering at Johns Hopkins University, 
United States of America, with maps generated to show 
the geographical heterogeneity across Muslim-majority 
countries. Case data per million population were plotted 
by time since 3 cases per million were reported in each 
country, to allow for comparisons between Muslim-ma-
jority countries, with respect to the speed with which the 
epidemic unfolded (3). 
To assess the progression of NPI implementation 
between March and May 2020, we created sequential 
maps utilizing the Coronavirus Government response 
tracker (OxCGRT) stringency index. This data set, 
created by a collaborative group of researchers and staff 
at Oxford University, United Kingdom, provides values 
to assess the differing stringency of NPIs in countries, 
specifically the strictness of ‘lockdown style’ policies 
that primarily restrict people’s behaviour (11). Maps 
were created to display the stringency index of Muslim-
majority countries for the first of each month from 
March to August 2020.
We also utilized the ACAPS government measures 
dataset compiled by analysts and volunteers from the 
University of Copenhagen and the University of Lund, 
Denmark (12), to assess the early phase of the COVID-19 
response, determined a-prior to be the end of Ramadan 
and Eid festivities (end May 2020). These data were 
compiled through internet searching of news reports, 
government sites and other organizations such as 
the United Nations (UN). Full details on the dataset 
structure and collection methods can be found through 
the ACAPS website (13). The full ACAPS data set was 
downloaded on 3 June 2020. From this, we determined 
the date of first policy implementation and date of phase 
out (where applicable) of measure categories in each 
country. In total, there were 32 different policy measures 
documented, which fall into five broad categories. These 
categories range from movement restrictions (such 
as visa restrictions, domestic travel restrictions and 
curfew) to public health measures (such as awareness 
campaigns and mask-wearing policy) to lockdowns 
(which includes full countrywide lockdown or lockdown 
of refugee/internally displaced persons camps). To better 
understand the difference in NPI implementation across 
Muslim-majority countries, the time between the WHO’s 
announcement of COVID-19 as a global pandemic and 
the implementation of various NPIs was calculated, with 
the mean number of days (and 95% confidence interval) 
plotted for each NPI. 
We assessed the nature and effectiveness of 
governance and civic society engagement in each country 
on the basis of its rankings on the democracy index, based 
on the 2019 Democracy Index Report of The Economist 
Intelligence Unit (14). This report scores countries based 
on electoral process and pluralism, the functioning of 
government, political participation, political culture, 
and civil liberties. We created tertiles of these scores to 
divide Muslim-majority countries into three democracy 
groupings: 1 (least democratic), 2 (middle tertile), and 3 
(most democratic). These classifications were used to 
compare the political response to COVID-19 between 
different democracy and governance categories. Cases 
per million population (for both periods) and the mean 
estimated doubling time for cases was compared between 
the democracy index tertiles.
Data from the Google Mobility Reports for each 
Muslim-majority country were assessed to determine 
whether the month of Ramadan (23 April 2020 – 23 May 
2020) or the Eid ul Fitr celebrations that followed, could 
be identified as having had an impact on the amount 
of time people in these countries spent at home, in 
congregational settings such as parks, and retail and 
workplace environments. Mean mobility scores for this 
month were compared to those for 11 March 2020 – 22 
April 2020, and 24 May 2020 – 3 June 2020. The date of 
11 March was chosen as the earliest for mobility scores, 
since most countries had stabilised around their lowest 
values by this date (15).
To relate the implementation and uptake of NPI 
measures, given the known variation in the onset and 
overall progression of COVID-19 infections, we grouped 
Muslim-majority countries on the basis of the timing 
and overall size of COVID-19 outbreak over this period. 
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In total, four outbreak timing/size categories were 
generated: early start and small outbreak; early start and 
large outbreak; late start and small outbreak; and late 
start and large outbreak. An early outbreak was defined as 
having at least 10 reported cases by the time of the WHO’s 
pandemic announcement of 11 March, while a small 
outbreak was defined as having fewer than 100 confirmed 
cases per million as of 1 June. Additional classifications 
to compare the COVID-19 response between Muslim-
majority countries included geography (based on World 
Bank regions) and population size (based on United 
Nations Population Division population estimates for 
2019) (16,17). 
To find reports on the extent of pushback or resistance 
related to the closure or restriction of religious activities, 
Google was utilized to find news reports for each country. 
The search location was set to the country of interest 
and searches were conducted pairing the country name 
with the keywords “mosque”, “COVID-19”, “coronavirus”, 
“prayer”, and “imam”. The first two pages of search 
results were screened and relevant articles were opened 
to look for indication of pushback. Pushback was then 
categorized as being by religious leaders (e.g. religious 
leaders or politicians from religious parties speaking out 
against government policy or encouraging continuation 
of prayer) or by the general public in response to 
restrictions on religious gathering (e.g. protests). 
Results
As of 1 August 2020, there was a total of 2 435 647 record-
ed cases of COVID-19 and 60 397 COVID-related deaths 
across 44 Muslim-majority countries. The greatest rela-
tive burden of both cases and deaths have been in Kyr-
gyzstan (5754 cases and 219 deaths per million popu-
lation, respectively) and Islamic Republic of Iran (3747 
cases and 210 deaths per million population, respectively) 
(Figure 1, Figure 2). It is worth noting, however, that test-
ing rates across Muslim-majority countries are generally 
low (Appendix 1 online) with the exception of a number 
of countries in the Gulf Region with relatively small in-
digenous populations.  
We divided our analysis into an assessment of the 
early stage of the COVID-19 response, arbitrarily defined 
as the period up to the end of Ramadan and Eid ul Fitr 
(end May 2020) and the subsequent phase of stabilization 
leading up to the Hajj (end July 2020). We therefore 
considered the period up to 1 June to be the first complete 
phase of response to the pandemic and treated this 
time as the primary period of interest, given that most 
stringent measures were seen to relax thereafter. We 
also compared this primary response period to the period 
from 2 June to 1 August and to the entire pandemic period 
included in the John Hopkin’s database up to the time of 
writing (22 January to 1 August 2020) (Figure 3).
Figure 1 COVID-19 cases per million population (as of 1 August 2020) 
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There was considerable variation in the 
commencement and rate of outbreak development. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey experienced 
outbreaks that started early and escalated rapidly. In 
contrast, Bangladesh’s outbreak began later but case 
trajectories have since mirrored those in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Turkey. Albania, Tunisia, and 
Lebanon experienced gradual outbreaks with slow rates 
of increase when compared to other Muslim-majority 
countries. Many Muslim-majority countries in Sub-
Figure 3 Stringency index scores for Muslim-majority countries as of A) 1 March 2020, B) 1 April 2020, C) 1 May 2020, D) 1 June 
2020, E) 1 July 2020, F) 1 August 2020. 
Figure 2 COVID-19 deaths per million population (as of 1 August 2020) 
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Saharan Africa appeared to be at earlier stages of their 
COVID-19 outbreaks relative to other Muslim-majority 
countries. Additionally, there was little evidence of 
widespread “second waves” of infection among Muslim-
majority countries, with the possible exception of 
Kyrgyzstan and Iraq (Figure 4). 
Our analysis showed some differences between 
governance categories among Muslim-majority countries 
and COVID-19 burden and trends. As of 1 June 2020, there 
were notable differences in COVID-19 cases per million 
population between governance groups, although they 
were not statistically significant. The most democratic 
countries had a mean of 199.7 cases per million (95% CI: 
137.0, 262.5); the middle tertile countries had a mean of 
2534.6 cases per million (95 % CI: 0.0, 5692.6); and the 
least democratic countries had a mean of 1442.3 cases 
per million (95% CI: 324.5, 2560.2). There was a significant 
difference between governance groups with regards to 
the percentage of countries that had flattened the curve 
by 1 June. Only 7.1% of the least democratic countries had 
flattened the curve (95% CI: 0.0, 21.6) whilst 30.8% (95% CI: 
3.8, 57.7) and 38.5% (95% CI: 10.1, 66.9) of the middle tertile 
and most democratic countries had flattened the curve, 
respectively (Table 1). However, over the entire period for 
which data were available (22 January to 1 August) there 
were no statistically significant differences observed 
between countries for any of the measures calculated 
(Table 2).
We evaluated if there was a direct link between 
COVID-19 response and policies and governance in 
each of the Muslim-majority countries. Policy data were 
available for 44 Muslim-majority countries in the first 
response phase of the outbreak. 
Among countries with listed start dates for policy 
measures, the most common control measure was 
suspension of international flights (90.1%). This was 
followed by limiting public gatherings (86.4%), domestic 
travel restrictions (79.5%) and school closures (79.6%). 
The mean time from the WHO pandemic declaration 
to the implementation of each policy indicated that 
a requirement for additional health documents was 
implemented earliest across countries, while the 
requirement to wear protective gear was implemented 
latest across countries (Figure 5). The mean number of 
days after the WHO’s declaration for partial lockdown to 
be implemented across countries was over two weeks (18 
days), while full lockdown occurred almost four weeks (26 
days) after the declaration. The range of implementation 
time varies widely for most policy measures. The reason 
for this is likely to be a combination of situational 
differences in case counts by country, countries learning 
from one another’s approach, and public acceptability.
Figure 4 Epidemic curves for all Muslim-majority countries showing cumulative cases per million population over time since 3 
cases per million were first reported. 
(Blue lines = named country. Grey lines = all other Muslim-majority countries) 
   
 
   
 
Figure 4: Epidemic curves for all Muslim-majority countries showing cumulative cases per 
million population over time since 3 cases per million were first reported. 
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We investigated whether there was an association 
between the month of Ramadan and increased mobility 
outside the home. We found less time was spent in places 
of retail (mean difference, md: -3.18; 95% CI: –5.21, –1.15; P 
= 0.002), in parks (md: –4.12; 95% CI: –6.03, –2.21; P < 0.001), 
and on transit systems (md: –4.38; 95% CI: –6.46, -2.30; P 
< 0.001) as compared to outside of Ramadan. Conversely, 
time spent in residential properties saw a statistically 
significant increase during the month of Ramadan (md: 
2.39; 95% CI: 1.61, 3.17; P < 0.001) (Appendix 2 online).
To illustrate the range of governmental responses to 
the COVID-19 pandemic in Muslim-majority countries, 
we selected Bangladesh, Islamic Republic of Iran, and 
Turkey for more in-depth analysis (Appendix 3 online). 
These particular countries were chosen as we considered 
they represent the early, current, and possible future 
hotspots of COVID-19 in Muslim-majority countries. 
The first reported case of COVID-19 in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran occurred on 19 February 2020. Early 
NPIs were limited to policies relating to health screening 
and preventing travel from China. Following the first 
detected case, no additional policy action was taken until 
27 February 2020, which then included closing all schools 
and border checks within major cities. Improvements to 
the public health system were made through donations 
of test kits and supplies from the Red Cross and Chinese 
government. Until the country had surpassed 1000 cases 
on 2 March, no additional actions were taken. At this 
time, flight suspensions to Europe were implemented 
along with awareness campaigns and temperature 
checks; inmates were temporarily released from prisons. 
This was in the wake of April protests that had called for 
additional prisoner protections and resulted in deaths of 
some of those protesting. The implementation of a partial 
lockdown, in which some parts of the government were 
closed, did not occur until 30 March when the country 
had already recorded over 41 000 cases and nearly 3000 
deaths. 
At the end of the first phase, Turkey had the greatest 
number of COVID-19 cases among all Muslim-majority 
countries, despite the first case not being reported until 11 
March 2020. Similar to the Islamic Republic of Iran, early 
policy measures focused on restrictions of travel from 
COVID-19 hotspots (primarily Islamic Republic of Iran and 
China). Within a week of the first reported case, policies 
were swiftly expanded to include a number of measures 
to promote social distancing. These included school 
closures, curfews and the closure of places of social and 
religious activity including mosques, bars, restaurants, 
sporting venues, and theatres. Over the following weeks, 
extensive policy implementation occurred. Along with 
this swift government action, a number of reports have 
Table 1 Cases per million, mean estimated doubling time, and percentage of countries with flattened epidemic curves by 
democracy group and early/late implementation of strict movement restrictions (as of 1 June 2020)
 Cases per million P-value Mean estimated 
doubling time (in days) 
over past 7 days
P-value Percentage of 




1 (Least democratic) (N=14) 1442.3 (324.5, 2560.2) REF 23.2 (17.3, 29.1) REF 7.1 (0.0, 21.6) REF
2 (N=13) 2534.6 (0.0, 5692.6) 0.414 101.8 (0.0, 204.7) 0.066 30.8 (3.8, 57.7) 0.160
3 (Most democratic) (N=13) 199.7 (137.0, 262.5) 0.353 48.5 (23.2, 73.9) 0.545 38.5 (10.1, 66.9) 0.065
Implemented strict movement 
restrictions early (N=44)
Yes (N=9) 596.1 (16.9, 1175.3) 0.481 49.0 (20.8, 77.3) 0.977 66.7 (28.2, 100.0) 0.003
No (N=35) 1549.6 (70.5, 3028.7)  48.2 (17.0, 79.3)  16.7 (2.5, 30.8)  
P-values calculated with t-tests. CI = Confidence Interval
Table 2 Cases per million, mean estimated doubling time, and percentage of countries with flattened epidemic curves by 
democracy group and early/late implementation of strict movement restrictions (as of 1 August 2020)
 Cases per million P-value Mean estimated 
doubling time (in days) 
over past 7 days
P-value Percentage of 




1 (Least democratic) (N=14) 3837.1 (374.3, 7299.9) REF 140.0 (65.8, 214.1) REF 78.6 (55.6, 100.0) REF
2 (N=13) 6482.0 (273.7, 12690.4) 0.360 139.9 (73.4, 206.4) 0.999 84.6 (63.5, 100.0) 0.717
3 (Most democratic) (N=13) 1039.7 (216.9, 1862.5) 0.333 125.0 (45.9, 204.2) 0.772 69.2 (42.3, 96.2) 0.576
Implemented strict movement 
restrictions early (N=44)
Yes (N=9) 1612.5 (472.0, 2752.9) 0.350 94.0 (0.0, 197.0) 0.582 66.7 (28.2, 100.0) 0.418
No (N=35) 4367.3 (1153.5, 7581.1)  117.3 (79.8, 154.7  80.0 (64.8, 95.2)  
P-values calculated with t-tests. CI = Confidence Interval
1179
Research article EMHJ – Vol. 26 No. 10 – 2020
Figure 5 Comparison of implementation of non-pharmacological mitigation actions and policies across Muslim-majority countries 
(data are mean value of days and 95% CI time in relation to WHO declaration of global pandemic on 11 March 2020) 
   
 
   
 
Figure 5: Comparison of implementation of non-pharmacological mitigation actions and 
policies across Muslim-majority countries (data are mean value of days and 95% CI time in 













indicated that government crackdowns had occurred 
to target claims of misinformation, resulting in the 
detainment of social media users and journalists (18).
Among all countries for which a phase one response 
snapshot was created, Bangladesh was one of only 
three (in addition to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) 
that implemented no social distancing-related policies 
before 1 June. Early policies instead focused on limiting 
travel and post-travel quarantine. In the month of April, 
multiple news agencies reported of thousands gathering 
at funerals (19,20). Given the current trajectory of cases 
in Bangladesh along with the considerably higher 
population density and the possible risk of COVID-19 
spreading within Rohingya refugee camps, the situation 
in Bangladesh has the potential to evolve significantly.
When comparing pushback between countries, it 
was found that many had closed mosques or restricted 
communal prayers. There were 16 countries for which 
we found pushback to distancing was reported by 
leaders, the public or both (Bangladesh, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Islamic Republic of Iran, Mali, Morocco, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Sudan and Turkmenistan). Of these 16 
countries, 11 had outbreaks that were classified as small 
and 9 had outbreaks classified as starting late. No other 
trends were seen between categories for this group. 
Examination of policy timing across the 16 countries 
with pushback indicated that half had implemented 
no COVID-19 related policies at the time of the WHO’s 
pandemic declaration, while a quarter (Bangladesh, Iraq, 
Mali, Turkmenistan) had implemented only one. Four 
countries implemented four or more policies before the 
WHO pandemic declaration (Indonesia, Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Pakistan and Sudan). 
Where pushback was reported, this consisted of 
mosques remaining open and communal prayers 
continuing despite the need for social distancing. In 3 
countries (Morocco, Niger and Senegal) this pushback 
escalated to protests and violence with the public and 
in some cases religious leaders being arrested (21-23). 
In Iraq, Nigeria, Senegal and Somalia there has been a 
mixed response from religious leaders. For example, 
in Somalia some militant religious leaders have spread 
misinformation (24). In response, mainstream Muslim 
clerics have closed madrassas to reduce the spread and 
are now using teachers from these schools as well as local 
Imams to spread accurate health information (24).
Discussion 
Recognizably, many factors driving the COVID-19 pan-
demic in countries such as rates of transmission, testing 
susceptible populations, prevalence of co-morbidities 
and health system functionality, are important in deter-
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mining the caseload and mortality. Another important 
driver of success or otherwise of national responses 
relates to the decision-making process and population 
responsiveness to NPIs in countries and the subject of 
this study. We restricted our analysis to countries facing 
common challenges related to communal religious prac-
tices such as Friday prayers and those in Ramadan and 
subsequent festivities. Our choice of the three countries 
for in-depth analysis was also justified by events there-
in and in neighbouring countries. Although the Islamic 
Republic of Iran was one of the earliest countries affect-
ed by COVID-19 in the Islamic world, the epidemic took 
longer to gain a foothold in other Muslim-majority coun-
tries, and in the case of Turkey it followed the outbreak 
in Europe. Afghanistan and Pakistan had received some 
of the earliest travelers from the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
mostly returning pilgrims, but were able to institute ear-
ly screening and quarantine measures followed by other 
measures. 
Elsewhere, religious aggregations and returning 
pilgrims were also blamed for the pandemic spread (25). 
In several countries, including Pakistan, Bangladesh and 
Muslim populations in India, there was acrimonious 
debate around widespread participation in religious 
activities and communal gatherings (26). However, our 
analysis of available data on population mobility from 
Muslim-majority countries and case loads does not 
suggest any link with mobility during the month of 
Ramadan or specifically on Fridays, the day for communal 
afternoon prayers. 
There is also a general sense that countries with 
non-democratic governments have been generally more 
successful in keeping the COVID-19 outbreak under 
control (27) compared to participatory democracies. 
Based on the governance metrics that we used, we found 
little evidence that strict governance was a major driver 
of COVID-19 in any of the Muslim-majority countries. 
In fact, it could be argued that the major outbreaks 
in Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, and Turkey took 
place despite such lockdown measures being imposed 
with force and rapidity. Given the need for community 
engagement and buy-in for many of the measures, such 
as stoppage of businesses, transportation and services, 
imposition of rules for physical isolation and use of 
masks, it can be argued that Muslim-majority countries 
with more democratic governments have done better in 
terms of sustaining a public response with widespread 
participation. This phenomenon is not just restricted 
to the Muslim world. No-one has underscored this link 
with pandemic responsiveness better than Francis 
Fukuyama who wrote that, “The factors responsible for 
successful pandemic responses have been state capacity, 
social trust, and leadership. Countries with all three – a 
competent state apparatus, a government that citizens 
trust and listen to, and effective leaders – have performed 
impressively, limiting the damage they have suffered” 
(28). Our analysis strongly supports this premise. 
Limitations
It is critically important that scientific enquiry and anal-
ysis is not hampered by confirmation bias (29). Notwith-
standing this limitation, our data do indicate that early 
imposition of non-pharmacological measures did impact 
the growth of COVID-19 infections, and epidemic curves 
have not indicated that strict imposition have led to su-
perior outcomes. We recognize that these are early days 
and the best data on consequences may only emerge over 
time, but it is important to test the counterfactual scenar-
ios through these natural experiments against analyses 
claiming the huge success of large-scale lockdowns and 
strict measures (27). At the time of writing, a few Mus-
lim-majority countries were still witnessing a secondary 
rise in cases whereas in others the curve seemed to have 
flattened – all indicative of a clear lack of association 
with severe mitigation strategies such as curfews and 
lockdowns. However, Saudi Arabia was able to institute 
remarkable control measures and restrictions over the 
Hajj, with no reported outbreaks. 
Several limitations should be recognized in 
considering these data and countries. As Appendix 
1 (online) indicates, testing rates remains low in the 
vast majority of Muslim-majority countries, with the 
exception of Qatar and United Arab Emirates. Our analysis 
is presently limited to burden estimates as reported in the 
aggregate and further work to evaluate and understand 
sub-national differentials and inequities is underway. 
We relied upon the governance assessment indicators 
provided by the independent analysis of the intelligence 
unit of The Economist and a widely used Democracy 
index. These measures could be complemented further 
by additional information on transparency as well as 
strengths of the public health systems in each Muslim-
majority country (14,30). Our analysis utilizes variables 
from a variety of different data sources and should 
therefore be interpreted with caution. While every effort 
has been made to ensure the credibility of these sources, 
the high level of complexity within each data source 
should be considered. We also recognize that while some 
differences in epidemiological patterns were evident 
in the early stage of the pandemic, they seem to have 
disappeared by the end of July. However, the pandemic 
is far from over and we intend to track progress in these 
countries in comparison to others prospectively. 
We have not presented findings on estimated indirect 
effects of pandemic and NPIs in these countries. Given 
the enormous indirect consequences of these public 
health measures and lockdowns on poverty, rising 
inequities and interruption of education services (30), 
further evaluation of the impact of COVID-19 in Muslim-
majority countries must include estimation of effects 
on longer term outcomes (31). These could relate to 
the consequences of short and medium-term political 
processes as well as long-term impact on economic and 
human development. 
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Analyse de la charge de morbidité de la COVID-19, épidémiologie et stratégies 
d’atténuation dans les pays à majorité musulmane 
Résumé
Contexte : Les pays à majorité musulmane ont connu une charge considérable d’infection par la COVID-19. On constate 
cependant un manque relatif de recherches comparant les flambées de COVID-19 et les ripostes entre les pays à majorité 
musulmane.
Objectifs : La présente étude visait à analyser la charge de morbidité de la COVID-19, l’épidémiologie de cette maladie 
et les stratégies d’atténuation de sa propagation dans les pays à majorité musulmane.
Méthodes : Nous utilisons une approche fondée sur des méthodes mixtes pour présenter l'évolution de la pandémie 
de COVID-19 dans le monde islamique, mettre en évidence l'éventail des interventions non pharmaceutiques utilisées 
et la vitesse à laquelle elles ont été mises en œuvre, et enquêter sur les raisons expliquant les différentes réponses entre 
les pays à majorité musulmane. Le nombre de cas et de décès par million d’habitants, ainsi que le délai médian 
nécessaire pour mettre en œuvre un ensemble de politiques, ont été comparés dans l’ensemble du monde islamique. 
Le nombre de cas par million d’habitants et la durée moyenne estimée du doublement des cas ont été comparés entre 
les pays à majorité musulmane sur la base des systèmes de gouvernance, de la rapidité de mise en place de stratégies 
d’atténuation et des groupes en conflit. Nous avons également évalué le refus de la mise en œuvre de mesures dans les 
pays à majorité musulmane, en particulier dans les milieux religieux.
Résultats : Les régimes non démocratiques avaient une durée de doublement des cas bien plus courte que les pays 
démocratiques à majorité musulmane fonctionnels (moyenne de 33,9 jours contre 66,5 jours, p = 0,002) et une 
proportion significativement plus importante de pays semblait avoir connu un aplatissement de la courbe 
au 1er juin 2020 (43,8 % contre 12,5 %, p < 0,03). Le temps de doublement était également nettement plus significatif 
parmi les pays qui ont mis en œuvre des mesures de confinement et d'atténuation de manière précoce (66,7 jours 
contre 16,7 jours, p < 0,003).
Conclusions : Notre analyse indique une grande diversité de la riposte face à la COVID-19 dans les pays à majorité 
musulmane, avec une indication claire que les démocraties fonctionnelles ont été capables de contenir l’épidémie de 
manière significativement meilleure que les régimes non démocratiques. L'analyse future devrait se concentrer sur la 
détermination des différentiels et des risques infranationaux ainsi que sur le ciblage des interventions.
حتليل عبء كوفيد-19 ووبائياته، واسرتاتيجيات التخفيف من أعبائه يف البلدان ذات األغلبية املسلمة 
راشيل جاردين، جيمس رايت، زينب صمد، ذوالفقار بوتا
اخلالصة
التي تقارن بني  البحوث  البلدان ذات األغلبية املسلمة عبًئا كبرًيا من عدوى كوفيد-19. ومع ذلك، يوجد نقص نسبي يف  اخللفية: لقد شهدت 
فاشيات كوفيد-19 واالستجابة هلا بني هذه البلدان.
األهداف: هدفت الدراسة إىل حتليل عبء كوفيد-19 ووبائياته واسرتاتيجيات التخفيف من أعبائه يف البلدان ذات األغلبية املسلمة.
طرق البحث: استخدمنا أسلوًبا خمتلًطا لوصف مسار جائحة كوفيد-19 يف مجيع أنحاء العامل اإلسالمي، وتسليط الضوء عىل جمموعة التدّخالت 
املسلمة.  األغلبية  ذات  البلدان  بني  املختلفة  االستجابات  وراء  الكامنة  األسباب  واستقصاء  هبا،  ذ  ُتَنفَّ التي  والرسعة  املستخدمة  الصيدالنية  غري 
العامل اإلسالمي.  أنحاء  السياسات يف مجيع  لتنفيذ جمموعة من  املستغرق  الوقت  وقورنت أعداد احلاالت والوفيات لكل مليون نسمة، ومتوسط 
ر ملضاعفة عدد احلاالت بني البلدان ذات األغلبية املسلمة عىل أساس نظم احلوكمة،  وقورنت أعداد احلاالت لكل مليون نسمة ومتوسط الوقت املقدَّ
ورسعة وضع اسرتاتيجيات التخفيف من العبء، واملجموعات التي تعاين من النزاعات. وقّيمنا أيًضا مقاومة تنفيذ التدابري داخل هذه املؤسسات، 
وال سّيام من األوساط الدينية.
النتائج: كان وقت مضاعفة احلاالت يف األنظمة غري الديمقراطية أقرص بكثري مقارنة بالبلدان الديمقراطية العاملة ذات األغلبية املسلمة )متوسط 
33.9 مقابل 66.5 يوًما، القيمة االحتاملية = 0.002( ويبدو أن نسبة أكرب بكثري من البلدان أّدت إىل تسّطح املنحنى بحلول 1 حزيران/يونيو 2020 
)43.8% مقابل 12.5%، القيمة االحتاملية > 0.03(. وكان وقت املضاعفة أكرب بكثري أيًضا بني البلدان التي نّفذت تدابري اإلغالق والتخفيف يف 
.)0.003 < P وقت مبكر )66.7 مقابل 16.7 يوم، القيمة االحتاملية
االستنتاجات: يشري حتليلنا إىل وجود تنّوع كبري يف استجابة كوفيد-19 يف مجيع البلدان ذات األغلبية املسلمة مع إشارة واضحة إىل أن الديمقراطيات 
العاملة متّكنت من احتواء الوباء أفضل بكثري من األنظمة غري الديمقراطية. وينبغي للتحليل أن يرّكز يف املستقبل عىل حتديد الفوارق واملخاطر عىل 
الصعيد دون الوطني وكذلك حتديد أهداف التدّخالت.
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